T.I., pp. * Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 5th December 2020. Plato is then perhaps moved to add simply because he feels that the plural expression is an unusual one for a form. In this way odd and even are a degree more exclusive than hot and cold. Another describes the final stage of the proof as ‘a blatant petitio principii’. The Phaedo is usually placed at the beginning of his “middle” period, which contains his own distinctive views about the nature of knowledge, reality, and the soul, as well as the implications of these views for human ethical and political life. page 228 note 1 It is perhaps not fanciful to suppose that as well as the development of the distinction between form and particularization, and between accidental and essential predication, there has been a progression, whether conscious or unconscious, in Plato's choice of examples of opposites. Rev. page 211 note 2 103e 2. But the fact that Socrates’ example of accidental attribution has to be expressed in terms of one thing's relation to another is incidental to the main purpose of the argument. Numbers can be only odd or only even in the same way as fire can be only hot and snow can be only cold. Socrates gives us four reasons to think that the soul is different from the attunement of an instrument: (1) the soul can exist before the body is made, (2) there are no degrees of soul like there are degrees of attunement, (3) if the attunement argument were correct, it would imply that no souls were better or worse than any other souls, and (4) the soul is master of the body. page 213 note 1 Essentially the same qualification is contained in 102e4, 102e8, 103d7, d 12, 104c3. 1. } page 207 note 4 is used in later Greek in a different sense, see L.S.J., s.v. page 225 note 1 It may be true, however, that soul is the only cause of life, in that other things are alive only through the agency of soul. }, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838800028329. from 102d6, from of hot or cold, 103e3, from of odd and even, 104c7, from 106d6. If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian. See the passages quoted by Verdenius, , p. 235. 4. But how could snow ‘possess’ some thing and impress its ‘character’ upon it? 1960), p. 41Google Scholar n. 284. Feature Flags last update: Sat Dec 05 2020 17:00:21 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, pp. Simmias can cease to be compared with Socrates—rather than Simmias' actually growing smaller or Socrates' actually growing larger—and in that case the comparative ‘largeness’ in Simmias ‘perishes’. 17–18Google Scholar, 24, 118, 191 n. 2, and, in passing, C.Q. A third remarks that the conclusion follows ‘if we do not look too closely’. page 221 note 1 10538. "comments": true, It is curious that in his commentary, p. 161, Hackforth should go out of his way to criticize Plato precisely for making fire the only cause of heat. Schmidt, H., Kritischer Commentar zu Plato's Phaedon, 2 Hälfte, Halle, 1850–1852Google Scholar. Hackforth, , p. 149Google Scholar n. 3, therefore describes as a ‘formal inaccuracy’. Whatever is true of fire will fairly obviously be intended to be true of snow. page 218 note 2 Verdenius's comparisons are accepted in effect by Rise, , op. page 226 note 2 There would be the same implication with the less likely alternative translation, although the verbal parallelism would be slightly less exact. Plato’s Phaedois a great dialogue written during his middle period. In the present instance ten is double five; five is half ten.Google Scholar. page 204 note 1 This is the interpretation of earlier writers and of Burnet, notes on 102d9 and ea; Taylor, A. E., Plato, the Man and his Work3, pp. "metricsAbstractViews": false, Bekker, I., Platonis … scripta graece omnia, etc., Phaedo, vol. The Phaedo's final argument ends at 106e-107a with the conclusion ‘a soul is something immortal and indestructible, and our souls really will exist in Hades’. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. Plato's Four Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul from the Phaedo part 4 4- Argument from Causation through Forms (Form of Life) (102b-107b) Objection: The soul pre-exists, but even if it continues after death, it might not be immortal; it might eventually wear out and perish. Williamson, H., The Phaedo of Plato, etc., LondonGoogle Scholar, 9104. It is adopted by Keyt, and earlier, for example, by Landmann, T., ‘Tendenz und Gedankengang des platonischen Dialogs “Phaedo” Gymnasialprogramm (Königsberg in Pr., 1871), p. 8Google Scholar, and Schneider, G., Die Weltanschauung Platos dargestellt im Anschlusse an den Dialog Phädon (Berlin, 1898), pp. Interpretations of this argument and especially of the last section have differed considerably. Now we have a substance, snow, which in virtue of an opposite characteristic cannot admit an opposite, but must withdraw or perish. Two problems with the last argument for the immortality of the soul in Plato’s Phaedo. 219 ff. writes, Taylor, op. For more recent discussion references are given by Verdenius, p. 210. Copyright © The Classical Association 1967, Hostname: page-component-b4dcdd7-9fdqb page 217 note 1 Burnet, note ad loc, denies that Plato's language here describes forms. Perhaps weshould prefer the commoner transitional sense, ‘of course'; so Hackforth. iii (1909), 189–91, adopts the latter translation at one point; another time he translates ‘itself also’. 143–4Google Scholar, not infrequently cause difficulty: some instances are discussed at the end of this section, see also pp. This chapter takes up the final argument when it turns to expounding the theory that it asserts, or at least hypothesizes, to be right, and follows the argument through to its conclusion. 135b17–26, 147a20–31, De soph. page 229 note 1 105e8. Since the moment of death is the final separation of soul and body, a philosopher should see it as the realization of his aim. page 223 note 2 105 b 7, looks back to 100c–e and 101d2, where is used three times. However, Socrates gives one final argument which will be the focus of this essay: namely the argument of the essential Form of Life. B., The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues, p. 8.Google Scholar, page 198 note 4 Crombie, I. M., An examination of Plato's doctrines, ii. page 221 note 2 105 a 8. The series of odd fractions like the series of even fractions excludes wholeness. Ls: Socrates is alive “___(…” is the conditional sign; it’s read as “If ___, then …”, or “If p, then q”. page 200 note 2 is repeated at 10362–5, e6, 104a2, a6, b1, b4, b8, d3, and in the case of soul 105d 1, d3, d 10. This study offers a new analysis of the last argument of Plato's Phaedo for the immortality of the soul. For the point of the analysis is that fire, for example, is like the form of hot in being always hot. The Last Argument of Plato's Phaedo. Once or twice the translation is deliberately literal at the expense of fluency. Socrates In The Phaedo Final Analysis. Academia.edu is a platform for academics to share research papers. If meant three as an attribute of numbered objects, then three oxen would be like large Simmias. Maybe coming to life is the former rather than the latter; but the argument seems to depend on it being an instance of the latter. "metrics": true, For we might perhaps argue that sensible fire ‘possesses’ wood and impresses its ‘character’ upon it. 232–3Google Scholar; Keyt, Scarrow, p. 169 n. 1.Google Scholar. The alternative notion, of three as the attribute of a group of numbered objects, is one that cannot in principle be easily defended. page 207 note 1 See Hackforth, , p. 165 n. 1, and Scarrow.Google Scholar. Phaedo Final Argument 1 dtouey. writes, Bluck, p. 118: ‘If a man who is bad in a certain respect is to become good in the same respect, the “bad in him” must first depart—it must either “flee and give way” or “perish’. For the combination of would show that what was compared to was not the small itself, but the small in us. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings. Argument 1: The Argument from Opposites (70b-72d) (1) If the souls of the living come only from the dead, then the souls of men who have died must exist in the underworld. )Google Scholar. 204–6Google Scholar (criticized by Ross, , P.   Scarrow, D. S., ‘Phaedo 106 A–106E’, Philos. Exposition and Criticism of the Final Argument for Immortality of the Soul in Phaedo April 8, 2019 by Essay Writer In the prior conversations, Cebes proposes that even though the soul is long-lasting, it can be worn out and destroyed (91d). Similarly, will be used in a moment, we shall argue, of the form of soul coming to particular soul, 105d3. For Plato forms are substances, if we are using that word in the Aristotelian sense, see, e.g., Met. page 218 note 1 It follows that in the preliminary statement of the numerical example, 104b 2–3, is later expressed as in line with 104e8–10. 216–17 above. 17–18Google Scholar, and less confidently Phronesis ii (1957). Socrates accepts that he has to die in order to attain the objectives of true philosophy (Cooper 94, Phaedo 63c). Hot and cold therefore can be manifested as more exclusive opposites than large and small. That no doubt is one reason why Plato chooses the example which he does. as well as being characterized by the even and excluding the odd. The exclusion of the alternative, depends on the preceding argument, where the metaphor is first introduced, not, as does on the conditional clause. "isLogged": "0", 106–8.Google Scholar. 19 Wachsmuth, ; and p. 161.Google Scholar. Only some things characterized by opposite forms are characterized essentially by them: as well as fire which is only hot there is water which can be at once both hot and cold. The qualification, which Hackforth leaves untranslated, looks forward to and the addition of, page 229 note 2 This view follows essentially from Strata's criticism, see p. 213 above. The Argument From Form of Life. page 208 note 1 p. 148 n. 3, cf. Perhaps, however, in the present argument Plato thinks of animal bodies as alive and of the soul as essentially alive. The latest additions are the articles by Rist and Haynes already cited, where references to earlier contributions may be found. The phrase ‘qua double’ destroys Plato's point, that numbers like ten and three are precisely to be distinguished from the opposites odd and even or double and half. Oxen themselves, if they were to be included in the theory, would be the particularization of another form. I will first explain some of Plato’s ontological presuppositions. lxx (1961), 245–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Verdenius, W. J., ‘Notes on Plato's Phaedo’, Mnemosyne, ser. 30–31)Google Scholar; Cornford, , Plato and Parmenides, p. 79Google Scholar (cf. 188–91Google Scholar. We shall see in a moment that Hackforth also equates and in this passage as ‘immanent form’. page 201 note 1 This way of thinking is clearly represented in Shorey, , see p. 209Google Scholar n. I below. Hackforth, R., Plato's Phaedo, etc., Cambridge, 1955Google Scholar. We shall observe below, p. 228 n. 1, that this difference may in fact have some secondary significance. ... the responses to the criticisms of the Recollection theory will indicate why it holds as the prominent argument over the Cyclical. Some systems of course allowed for the notion of 105 c 2, looks back to 101 C 8. page 225 note 3 Whatever is true of fire will presumably be true also of fever: but it is best to found our analysis on those examples which Plato has described more in detail. In Phaedo four arguments describe how the soul can be immortal with the fourth argument presenting what most deem the most convincing and the most sound. The halves of double numbers, e.g. And yet, for the purposes of the argument, whatever is true of fire should presumably be true also of snow. page 213 note 2 Fr. page 226 note 1 Opinions on the possibility of soul as form have been given above, p. 219. Something like snow has the particularized characteristic, of an opposite form. page 205 note 2 This follows Heindorf ap. "hasAccess": "0", "lang": "en" Archer-Hind conjectures. Bekker, in making out that it is specific numbers like ten and five, not die opposites double and half, which constitute the exception to Plato's earlier statement of his thesis. "openAccess": "0", page 203 note 2 ‘Withdraw’ is used to cover, in the present passage, and and later in the argument 106a4, and or 106a10 and e7. A thing can be both hot and cold: at the same time hotter than one thing and colder than another, and at different times hotter and colder than the same thing. In fact Plato's distinction in the Parmenides between the form of likeness and ‘the likeness which we have’ is precisely the same as the distinction in the Phaedo between the form of large and ‘the large in us’. pp. We have observed above, p. 203, that Hackforth designates as ‘immanent form’. Contrast Bluck, , op. But there is nothing that can be odd and even at the same time, in the way that water can be at the same time hotter than one thing and colder than another. This obscures the point that the initial idea, largeness, is not the idea precisely of what Shorey calls the particular, namely Simmias. the opposite itself as the opposite in us and the opposite in nature, is not a duplication in some strange sense of the form, but the normal division between form and particularization of form Cf. contact us cit., p. 205Google Scholar: ‘When “cold” at tempts to “occupy” fire, or “heat” to “occupy” snow, an essential character of the thing must either “withdraw” or be “annihilated”, and in either case (my italics) the thing, the fire or the snow, is no longer the thing it was’. G. Stallbaum, Platonis opera omnia, etc., Phaedo, editio quarta … curavit Wohlrab, M., Lipsiae, 1864Google Scholar. He asserts that the soul can only gain wisdom once the physical body is dead. Loading... Unsubscribe from dtouey? For ‘the duplication of the idea’, i.e. , and if you can't find the answer there, please You could not be signed in, please check and try again. FAQs To troubleshoot, please check our Soul can be only alive, in the way in which three can be only odd and two can be only even. Three oxen would contain as an attribute the particularization of the form of three. Now Plato introduces a new feature: things like fire and snow that can be only hot or only cold. For fire can turn something into fire: but it is not obvious that snow can turn something into snow. page 221 note 4 The opposites are almost certainly double and half, not double and single, as Hackforth, prefers, p. 153Google Scholar n. 1. I. Its middle-period classification puts it after “early” dialogues such as the Apology, Euthyphro, Crito, Protagoras, and others which present Socrates’ search… There will be the distinction between form and particular whichever translation we adopt, cf. vi (1956), 33–34Google Scholar; Verdenius, , pp. Eel. page 226 note 3 There is the same implication at Rep. 611a4–6. Interpretations of this argument and especially of the last section have differed considerably. Cornford in his article on this passage, C.Q. page 199 note 1 e.g. Query parameters: { 14 The Soul as an Inner Principle of Change: The Basis of, 19 Ideas Leap Barriers: The Value of Historical Studies to Philosophy. Part I: The Final Argument In the final argument of the Phaedo, Plato attempts to show that the soul is immortal. It argues that this theory is weak enough to be plausible, yet strong enough to come surprisingly close to yielding the conclusion that a soul is something immortal and indestructible. The dialogue covers subjects such as the meaning of piety and justice. "crossMark": true, For snow is never hot. II - Volume 18 Issue 1 - D. O'Brien. Hackforth's, constant references to ‘immanent form’, cf. It was the last dialogue of the seven that he wrote in the middle period of Socrates final days the others included Theaetetus, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Statesman and … On the question of intermediates in the Phaedo see Ross, , P. 1080al, where the forms of the Phaedo are described as. Wagner, W., Plato's Phaedo, etc., Cambridge, 1870Google Scholar. The Phaedo's final argument ends at 106e-107a with the conclusion ‘a soul is something immortal and indestructible, and our souls really will exist in Hades’. But very possibly Plato is thinking simply of comparison. Archer-Hind, R. D., The Phaedo of Plato, etc., 2nd edition, London, 1894Google Scholar. Mills, , Phronesis ii (1957), 139–40Google Scholar, distinguished ‘the opposite in us’ from both forms and ‘sensible participants’ or ‘sensibles’, without making it clear whether he means sensible qualities or sensible substances: as will be seen, the distinction is crucial. page 223 note 1 A less literal translation will be: ‘What makes whatever body it comes to be in hot … holness makes whatever it comes to be in hot.'. Elsewhere the fact that one opposite form will not accept its opposite is expressed in terms of 102d6, 103c 1, or ’always having the right to its own name’, 103e3–4, e6–7, or simply in terms of and 103b4–5, C7–8. page 199 note 2 I use the term ‘particularization’ to express the sensible manifestation of the form of an attribute as well as of the form of a substance. Learn exactly what happened in this chapter, scene, or section of Phaedo and what it means. page 217 note 2 Hackforth's interpretations of this passage, if carried to their conclusion, lead to hopeless confusion. 5, London, 1826.Google Scholar, page 198 note 2 Hackforth, , p. 164.Google Scholar, page 198 note 3 Skemp, J. The Phaedo's final argument ends at 106e-107a with the conclusion 'a soul is something immortal and indestructible, and our souls really will exist in Hades'. 105 c 2, looks back to 101 C 8. page 224 note 1 Hackforth's translation follows Archer-Hind. Phaedo, the dialogue of Plato that concerns Socrates’ final words, is both profound and prone to strike the reader as bizarre and mysterious. This data will be updated every 24 hours. The colour of an apple, which is an accidental but not a relative attribute, would have served equally well as a contrast to, and as a preparation for, the essential hotness of fire and the essential aliveness of soul. Full text views reflects PDF downloads, PDFs sent to Google Drive, Dropbox and Kindle and HTML full text views. (Similarly, fire itself is not an opposite; but in so far as it is characterized by hot it is, we may suppose, an ).
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